At the heart of human good: a critique to a liberal reading of Kant by Villarmea Requejo, Stella
 1 
AT THE HEART OF HUMAN GOOD: A CRITIQUE TO A LIBERAL 
READING OF KANT 
Stella Villarmea 
Universidad de Alcalá, Spain 
 
Talk of 20’+ 10’ discussion. XI Symposium of the International Association of 
Women Philosophers, “Human Good – Dignity, Equality, and Diversity”, 
Göteborg, Sweden, 17-19 June 2004. 
 
1. Introduction: good, freedom, and emancipation 
In emancipatory fields, reflections about the notion of good and the warrant of 
freedom are tied together. To consider women and men as free human beings implies to 
let them enjoy equal access to opportunities, resources and capabilities that have to do 
with the recognition of their personalities and the respect to their life options. The 
protection of freedom requires a serious acknowledgment of the subject’s capacity to 
self-determine the particular conception of welfare and good life that is going to lead 
her life.  
Drucilla Cornell is one of many feminist thinkers who have thought about the 
the connection between freedom and goodness in relation to gender issues. In her book 
At the Heart of Freedom she argues that a society must treat each individual as 
autonomous so that each subject ought to be able to choose her own ends in life. Cornell 
contends that such a view corresponds to a liberal reading of Kant. I will try to show 
here that there is a fundamental mistake in her attribution. The clarification of the 
mistake aspires not only to avoid a philosophical injustice to the Kantian project; but 
also to point out how contemporary feminism could benefit from Kantian ethics, when 
correctly understood. 
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The presentation will proceed in the following way. First, I will present 
Cornell’s main ideas on freedom and equality. Then I will show how they contradict 
Kant’s view of morality. Last, I will briefly comment on some of the advantages of the 
Kantian approach for contemporary feminism. 
 
2. Cornell revisits Kant 
1. Introduction 
Drucilla Cornell [say something about her] presents her [last] work, At the Heart 
of Freedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality
1
 as a contemporanean development of 
Kantian ethics. She supports her appeal to Kant by her acknowledgement of the central 
role that autonomy and freedom play in individual action. For her, the recognition of 
autonomy and individual freedom protect any agent from the illegitimate restrictions 
that other people might exert over her actions.  
The basic premise in her argument is that the individual ordination of 
preferences is not to be discussed, for there is no common instance from which to 
impose a unique vision of good. In other words, there is no universal criterion to judge 
each subject’s notion of goodness. Cornell’s approach implies that the individual 
ordination of preferences is a question of taste, interest, or personal convenience; hence, 
and translated into Kantian terms, a question more of inclination than of rationality. 
Such an approach would neglect to ask why we have certain preferences, as well as 
whether their construction along time has been rational.  
In my opinion, though, Cornell’s appeal to Kant is sui generis, to say the least. 
Why? Because Kant combines, in a coherent albeit sophisticated manner, the following 
two theses. On the one hand, each subject has an individual but indeterminate 
conception of happiness; the notion of good is thus individual –as Cornell well states. 
On the other hand, however, for Kant a correct moral action is never governed by the 
agent’s notion of happiness, for the agent ought not to take into account her own 
happiness when judging what she ought to do. As a consequence of these two theses, 
Kant sustains that although the content of happiness is not universal, good moral action 
                                                 
1
 Cornell, Drucilla, At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality, Princeton NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 1998, (En el corazón de la libertad: Feminismo, sexo e igualdad, 
Madrid, Cátedra, 2001). (La paginación de las citas corresponde a la versión española.) 
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is one and the same for every human being. In fact, that is exactly the essence of 
Kantian ethics: the claim that the supreme principle of morality is universal because the 
notion of good is based on the agent’s reason, not on her inclination towards happiness. 
Hence, my criticism to Cornell is that, against her purpose, her approach goes 
directly against the essence of Kantian ethics, i.e., formal universalism. Since formal 
universalism is the core of Kantian ethics, it will be necessary to conclude that Cornell’s 
interpretation and use of Kant is fundamentally mistaken. Thus whatever her liberal 
reading may be about, she cannot truly claim to be an heir of Kant. 
 
2. Cornell walks along Kant’s path 
Cornell’s feminist project is inserted within certain interpretation of the liberal 
tradition, whose fathers she locates in Kant, Rawls and Dworkin. Her main concern is 
with women’s freedom, over and above what has up to now been the most frequent 
demand of feminism, i.e., formal equality with men. According to Cornell we have to 
shift the focus so that instead of being concerned with the kind of freedom that is 
necessary to be equal, we start focusing on the kind of equality that is necessary to be 
free. It is about time that we talk straightly of women’s freedom for “the freedom of 
each person to pursue his or her own happiness in his or her own way, is crucial to the 
ability of any person to enjoy the glories of life”.  
Cornell defends that the notion of freedom includes the freedom to conceptualise 
gender relations and to act in relation to them, and especially the freedom to react 
against any kind of enforced sexual choice or identity. This extensive definition of 
freedom is, according to her, based on the Kantian conception of a free subject as a self-
determinating agent. In particular, it is based on the existence of, what she calls, “the 
imaginary sphere”. The imaginary sphere refers to a space where we (re)imagine and 
(re)configure ourselves, that is, a space that allows us to define and evaluate who we 
would like to become.  
Cornell’s defence of “the sanctuary of the imaginary domain” explicitly 
underlines the right to create ourselves as sexual beings — much in the line of Judith 
Butler’s approach. Particularly, such freedom includes the right not to behave according 
to a pre-defined conception of what female or male identities are. Therefore, the 
recognition of freedom that Cornell advocates, will protect our right to represent or own 
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sexuality, promote the emancipation from any sexual options that the State might 
impose, and facilitate the struggle against the frequent reinforcement of common and 
unifying patterns by basic institutions of society. 
Once having analysed the idea of freedom, Cornell is ready to take her second 
step in the argument, that is, to reflect about the kind of equality that will allow us to 
exercise our freedom. To this purpose, she engages in a lively discussion of a great 
variety of today’s hot issues, like for example, the regulation of prostitution, the rights 
of rental mothers and of adopted children, the reform of family law, the reactionary 
father’s movement, the rights and duties of parents, and the international agenda of 
human rights. Cornell is conscious that the theoretical framework she employs does not 
determine a unique position in relation to each of these issues, for the same ideal of 
freedom and protection of the imaginary sphere could give rise to opposite views about 
them. However, she claims that universalising the sphere of the imaginary contributes 
firmly to discard stereotypical answers. The hope being that, by giving a fresh impetus 
to the traditional lines of debate, new foundations for future dialogues could be settled 
down. 
I think her reflections are a good proof of what she hopes for. The great 
advantage of her approach is that it helps clearing the path from stagnant perspectives. 
Definitely, some old themes deserve new approaches. 
For if we really conceive freedom as related to the self-determination of one’s 
goals in life, then we will have a powerful tool to test gender equality. After all, it is still 
the case that most women do not enjoy equal access to the same opportunities, resources 
and capacities that have to do with the recognition of their personality and with the 
respect to their chosen ways of life as most men do. The strength of this thesis continues 
to be revolutionary. 
 
3. Cornell walks away Kant’s path 
As we have seen, Kant’s influence on Cornell shows in her emphasis on 
freedom, self-determination, and autonomy, as well as in her consideration of the 
imaginary sphere as the empty space, which each subject fills on their own. The fact 
that women have historically been denied, in theory as in practice, the appropriation of 
these concepts, makes necessary to continue to reflect on them and to demand that their 
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application be universal. In my view, this aspect of Cornell’s’ appeal to Kant is 
impeccable. 
However, I do not agree with considering another premise of her discourse as 
Kantian, despite her much insistence on it. For there are two aspects of Cornell’s 
exposition that are not coherent with a Kantian perspective. First, Cornell seems to take 
freedom for granted, as if it were an ontological feature of any human being. By 
contrast, Kant conceives of freedom as a condition of possibility for morality; it is 
neither a given ontological feature nor an ideal to be fulfilled by social conditions. In 
Kant’s view, the existence of freedom cannot be guaranteed; we rather have to suppose 
it for the morality to be possible. Just this is the transcendental element of Kant’s 
theory, which ought not be overlooked. (More technically exposed, we would say that 
freedom is a “postulate of reason”, a “transcendental condition of possibility” for 
morality). 
Second, in Kant’s approach freedom has nothing to do with the agent’s search 
for happiness but, quite on the contrary, with her duty to act morally. That means that 
we have to suppose that the moral agent is free to preserve her autonomy, in other 
words, to warrant that she can give to herself a rule of conduct independently of her 
inclinations. Freedom is not the capacity to do what we feel like doing; but the capacity 
just not to do what we feel like doing. This is precisely the formal universalist element 
of Kant’s theory, which should also not be disregarded. 
Being oblivious to these two essential Kantian premises, Cornell seems to be 
thinking too frequently that the consideration of the subject as a free agent contributes 
to her enjoyment of happiness. That to acknowledge the agent’s freedom will facilitate 
her fulfilment of welfare. Unfortunately, such a perspective corresponds, however, more 
to a consequentialist program of general welfare à la Mill than to a formal universalist 
ethics such as Kantian is. The fact that Cornell goes astray from Kant in these two 
essential points must be stressed. 
At this point, it could be convenient to recall some central aspects of Kantian 
ethics. In particular, it might even be helpful to our purpose to present the content of the 
categorical imperative, as it is expressed in the third formula. Our presentation will be 
brief and aims to facilitate the eventual understanding of Kant’s benefits for ethical 
feminism. 
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3. Kant: third formula of the categorical imperative 
1. A formal rule, which is at the same time strictly universalist and radically 
individualizing 
The third formula of the categorical imperative expresses the idea that we ought 
to act in such a way that our will, being rational, could turn into a will giving general 
laws. The so-called principle of the autonomy implies that the will “is not being 
subjected simply to law, but is so subjected that it must be regarded as giving itself the 
law, and for this very reason is subject to the law of which it may consider itself the 
author“. 
According to Kant, when the will acts that way, it gives itself the law, i.e., it is 
autonomous. It is precisely because such a will does not take into account any particular 
interest, not even the agent’s interests, that it can be universally lawgiving and ground 
an unconditional imperative. (…) It is therefore possible that someone accepts a law that 
he gives to himself, and that the law be at the same time universally binding.  
Thus, the third formula of morality entails that to be a person means to be 
competent to determine one’s ends for oneself. Kantian ethics underlines that to act 
morally right does not simply imply to refrain from doing any harm to others. Also, we 
ought to respect the other’s ends, that is, each person’s peculiar idea of happiness, and, 
furthermore, we ought to help others to achieve happiness as well. 
In sum, Kantian morality combines the following two ideas: On the one hand, 
everybody has the faculty of self-determination so that each person chooses his or her 
ends individually and looks for happiness in her or his particular way. On the other 
hand, any agent ought, when acting morally, to further the others’ achievement of 
happiness. 
Hence, the categorical imperative is, at the same time, both strictly universalist 
(for it applies to all agents equally) and radically individualizing (since it requires that 
the agent perceives and supports the specific needs of others).  
In my opinion, the requirement that the agent’s actions ought to be taken 
autonomously together with the acknowledgement of the role need, welfare and 
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happiness play in human lives, turn the categorical imperative into an extremely helpful 
tool to analyse and evaluate gender issues. 
 
2. The importance of Kantian approach for ethical feminism 
Certainly, Kant’s moral philosophy can be of much relevance to feminist 
understanding of equality. For Kant’s treatment of the relation between human good and 
freedom serves to illustrate the kind of moral justification that lies at the feminist claim 
for equality. As we have seen, Kant distinguishes the fact that everyone aims for 
happiness and conceives it in a particular way, from the command that the agent ought 
to be free when acting morally, i.e., that she ought not to consider her achievement of 
happiness when deciding how to act morally right. In Kantian terms, the only right 
motive to act morally well is duty, not search for happiness. 
Now even if her own happiness is never a right motive to decide what to do, the 
agent is still morally obliged to take into account the other’s happiness. In fact, it is only 
by putting into brackets our inclinations towards happiness that we exercise our 
freedom, that is to say, that we can reason and act independently of our situation, 
interests, desires, hopes, needs, etc. Only under that condition it makes sense the moral 
precept to respect the other’s happiness.  
Why then is Kantian thought powerful for feminism? Because it justifies that the 
promotion of a woman’s happiness be a reason to act. Naturally, this thesis must be 
correctly understood. The point is not, as Cornell seems to have taken, that the female 
agent is allowed to pursue her own happiness; rather that any agent is obliged (when 
acting morally right) to help others achieve their happiness, indistinctively of their 
gender.  
When we apply this command to analyse practical matters from the perspective 
of gender, we realise how different the treatment is when the other is a man or a woman. 
For once and again social, economical, political, religious and cultural studies show that 
when the other happens to be a woman, she does not get so much respect, recognition 
and promotion of her self-determinated idea of welfare, happiness and goals in life as 
when it happens to be a man. To this respect, Kantian ethics is beneficial for feminism 
not only because it helps diagnose a wound that is still open, but especially because it 
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helps developing the kind of conceptual and moral treatment that would be needed to 
heal it up. 
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IDEAS FOR DISCUSSION 
Economical forces 
Despite the interest and suggestiveness of her discussion, however, a caution has 
to be mentioned here. Cornell pays little attention to the economical forces that 
constrain our freedom, nor to the economical conditions that would help to establish it. 
After all, sexual freedom is not completely independent of economical justice 
 
Examples of the application of the Kantian approach to gender issues 
(drawn from Nagl-Docekal 
2
) 
The appeal to the categorical imperative reveals numerous defects in the 
treatment that women obtain based on their gender. A project like this will focus on the 
following two essential aspects of the moral law:  
First, the duty to respect the ends that the others determinate for themselves (as 
long as they are subject to certain moral limitations). In general, because of the gender 
roles assigned to them, women are presented with limited options, and therefore offered 
less opportunities of personal fulfilment. For example, women, unlike men, must 
frequently choose between career and family, or are able to maintain both projects with 
more effort and tensions that what men need to devote. To a large extent, it is precisely 
in relation to body matters, sexual identity, maternity and work issues that women gain 
or loose our right to imagine who we want to become. 
Second, the precept to contribute or further that human beings fulfil their self-
determinated ends. This aspect of the categorical imperative forces us to ask to what 
degree women find support in their individual search for happiness. The question here 
is, what can be done to enable women to seize de facto the opportunities (e.g., in terms 
of educational, occupational, and political equality) that are accessible to them de jure? 
In this respect, measures such as programs for affirmative action and quota regulation 
acquire their moral justification as attempts at ending a situation in which women are 
denied moral treatment in the sense of support for their self-chosen ends. 
                                                 
2
 Herta Nagl-Docekal: “Feminist ethics: How it could benefit from Kant’s moral philosophy?” 
in Schott (ed.): Feminist Interpretations of I. Kant. Penn State, 1997. 
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The problem should not be framed just as conflicts of interest 
Applying the categorical imperative to concrete gender asymmetries renders 
apparent the moral character of problems otherwise likely to be regarded merely in 
terms of conflicts of interest. Hence, Kantian ethics is extremely interesting for the 
development of an ethical feminism. 
 
The judgement is by comparision with men’s situation, not ideally 
Es necesario garantizar que las mujeres accedan (en la misma medida en que lo 
hacen los varones) a las oportunidades que legalmente les corresponden y de las que 
depende (idealmente) que vivan el tipo de vida que cada una escoja.  
En cualquier caso, y a fin de evitar cómodas objeciones de partida que califiquen 
el proyecto de utopía fantasiosa (en el sentido negativo de impracticable), debe quedar 
claro que el patrón de medida con el que valorar moralmente las distintas situaciones, es 
simplemente que las mujeres consigan lo mismo que disfrutan en términos generales los 
sujetos masculinos, ni más ni menos. 
 
Final caution 
And, yet, a final caution has to be mentioned. Including the other’s ends among 
my own ends is, no doubt, a beautiful definition of love, which can lead to further moral 
and political analysis and conclusions. However, it is still an open question whether 
political action can and should be built upon this premise: that the ethics commands us 
to love can (or not) be considered an excessive duty.  
 
